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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On August 21-23, 1984, the Plaintiffs1 action 
came on for trial before a jury in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick presiding. The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs. After the verdict 
was returned, the Defendant-Respondent Capitol Thrift 
and Loan's ("Capitol Thrift") motions for directed 
verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
were denied. TR.421. Capitol Thrift appealed the 
judgment to this Court, which transferred the case to 
the Utah Court of Appeals for decision. The Utah Court 
of Appeals reversed the jury verdict. A copy of the 
Court of Appeals opinion is attached as Addendum "A". 
Plaintiff-Appellants f ("Plaintiff" ) petition 
for a rehearing, before the Court of Appeals was denied 
on December 2, 1987. The Order is attached as Addendum 
"B". On December 30, 1987, Plaintiff filed a petition 
for Writ of Certiorari which was granted by this Court 
on February 23, 1988. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Court of Appeals err in 
reversing the jury verdict when it found that the 
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evidence was insufficient to support a civil conspiracy 
claim. 
II. Did the trial court err when it denied 
the motions for directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstanding verdict. 
III. Did the trial court err in instructing 
the jury that punitive damages can be awarded on a 
different standard of proof than that applied to the 
underlying wrongful act complained of. 
REFERENCE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS 
1. Opinion filed November 16, 1987 by the 
Court of Appeals in Case No. 860072-CA, reversing a 
jury verdict against Capitol Thift and Loan in favor of 
the Plaintiff. Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 
785 (Utah App. 1987). Attached as Addendum "A". 
2. Order of the Court of Appeals dated 
December 2, 1987, denying the petition for rehearing. 
Attached as Addendum "B". 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF UTAH 
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES 
1. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10. 
2. U-C.A. Section 78-2-2(5)(1988). 
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3, Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
These provisions are set forth in the 
attached Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs initiated this action alleging 
that the Defendants conspired to defraud the now 
deceased Israel Pagan in the sale of his house. In 
August, 1984, the case came on for trial before a jury 
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs and 
awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The 
District Court denied Capitol Thrift's motions for 
directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 
Capitol Thrift appealed the judgment to this 
Court, which transferred the case to the Court of 
Appeals for decision. The Court of Appeals reversed 
the jury verdict as to Capitol Thrift, and remanded for 
proceedings consistent with the Opinion which is 
attached as Addendum "A11 . The Court of Appeals 
reversed the verdict because it did not find sufficient 
evidence against Capitol Thrift to support Plaintiffs' 
conspiracy theory. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime prior to August 18, 1980, Israel 
Pagan listed his property for sale with Century 21 for 
the sales price of $44,000.00. TR.84. On July 30, 
1980, Dorius Black entered into an earnest money 
receipt and offer to purchase which provided for 
payment of $20,000.00, including $1,000.00 in earnest 
money, to be paid to the Plaintiff at closing, and a 
deferred payment of $24,000.00, for a total purchase 
price of $44,000.00. The balance of $24,000.00 was to 
be deferred for one year with subsequent payments 
occurring over the next two year period. TR.749-750. 
The offer was accepted by Mr. Pagan on July 30, 1980. 
Although Mr. Black negotiated the purchase of 
the home, he never intended to actually buy the home 
for himself. TR.493. The evidence introduced at 
trial showed that on occasion Mr. Black, an independent 
businessman, worked with a Joseph Cannon on various 
business deals. The evidence showed that Mr. Black 
signed the earnest money agreement with Mr. Pagan as 
part of a business arrangement with Mr. Cannon. 
TR.492-493. 
In a separate transaction, Mr. Black 
approached Capitol Thrift about a loan for the purchase 
of the home. TR.495. Mr. Black did not apply for the 
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loan; Mr. Cannon did. TR.594-595,651. Along with his 
loan application, Mr. Cannon provided financial 
statements on himself and for Alpha Leasing Company, a 
partnership in which Mr. Cannon held a partnership 
interest. TR.595-596. Mr. Cannon also signed a 
borrower's statement providing that the loan would be 
used for strictly business purposes. TR.596. 
Based on the value of the home and Mr. 
Cannon1s financial strength, the lender agreed to loan 
$32,325.00 to Mr. Cannon for the purpose of purchasing 
the subject property. The subject property had an 
appraised value of $43,100.00. The loan officer, 
Merlyn Hanks, testified that he normally made loans 
with a loan to value ratio at between 65 and 85 percent 
and that this $32,325.00 on the Pagan house fell within 
this range. TR.611-613. 
Although Mr. Cannon did not recall borrowing 
money from Capitol Thrift, he testified that he 
personally signed the loan application, the escrow 
instructions, and the Capitol Thrift promissory note 
and trust deed. TR.583-596. In fact, Mr. Cannon went 
to Capitol Thrift and extended his loan payments on two 
separate occasions when the loan became delinquent. 
TR.855. 
The evidence introduced at trial established 
that Capitol Thrift lent money directly to Mr. Cannon, 
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and that Capitol Thrift was not involved in any of the 
business arrangements between Mr. Black, Mr. Cannon or 
Alpha Leasing. TR.523-524. The business arrangement 
to purchase the Pagan home was between Mr. Cannon, 
Alpha Leasing and Mr. Black. In factf the loan officer 
did not even know who Mr. Pagan was at that time. 
TR.860. The evidence clearly showed that Capitol 
Thrift1s involvement was limited to the promissory note 
transaction with Mr. Cannon. TR.860. 
On August 18, 1980, the day appointed for 
closing, a check in the amount of $32,325.00 was 
delivered to Stewart Title with specific instructions 
on how and when the check could be negotiated and 
the loan proceeds disbursed. TR.613. Mr. Cannon 
denied endorsing the check, but did acknowledge 
receiving disbursements according to the instructions. 
TR.575. The letter of instruction required that title 
to the property be in the name of Joseph N. Cannon. 
The letter of instruction also provided that a trust 
deed in favor of Capitol Thrift was to be recorded as a 
first trust deed subject to no other liens or 
encumbrances. In addition, Stewart Title was 
instructed to disburse the funds as follows: 
(1) $4,848.75 to Capitol Thrift; (2) fees for recording 
title and for an insurance policy; and (3) the 
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remainder of the funds to Joseph N. Cannon or as he 
directed. TR.616, 667. 
The $4,848.75 represented the balance on a 
loan owed by Mr. Black to Capitol Thrift. The return 
of the $4,848.75 to Capitol Thrift to pay off Mr. 
Blackfs loan was based on a finderfs fee arrangement. 
A fee of this type was normal practice for a lending 
institution like Capitol Thrift. TR.865-866. 
Bruce L. Moesser was an Executive Vice 
President with Capitol Thrift at the time of the loan 
transaction. TR.863. Mr. Moesser supervised the loan 
to Mr. Cannon. TR.863. Mr. Moesser did not know who 
Mr. Pagan was at the time of the transaction and did 
not see anything unusual about the loan to Mr. Cannon. 
TR.863-864, 867. 
Scott Peatross, of Bill Brown Realty, 
contacted Tommy Sisk of Stewart Title and scheduled the 
closing for August 18, 1980. TR.689. Mr. Pagan and 
his interpreter, Emilio Ortiz, Tommy Sisk of Stewart 
Title, Scott Peatross, Joseph Cannon, Dorius Black, and 
Jack Rhodes and Vickie Phelps of Century 21 were 
present at the closing. TR.667, 580. Because of a 
delay, Mrs. Phelps left before the closing actually 
took place and was replaced by Mr. Rhodes. TR.750, 
718. 
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Tommy W. Sisk was employed by Stewart Title 
Company and had 10 years' experience in the title 
insurance business. He presided over the escrow and 
closing. TR.663. The testimony clearly establishes 
that Mr. Sisk conducted the closing in a careful manner 
so that Mr. Pagan was able to understand the 
transaction through his interpreter. TR.693. It was 
also shown that Mr. Pagan asked numerous questions 
through his interpreter when he did not understand 
parts of the transaction. TR.693. Mr. Sisk testified 
that he explained all of the documentation to Mr. 
Pagan, including the fact that Mr. Cannonr not Mr. 
Black, was purchasing the property. TR.671. Mr. Sisk 
testified that it was not inconsistent with the terms 
of the earnest money agreement to have the substitution 
of Mr. Cannon as the buyer of the property. TR.690-691. 
It was further explained to Mr. Pagan that 
the total amounts of the first and second trust deeds 
would exceed the $44,000.00 sales price of the subject 
property, and that the trust deed in favor of Capitol 
Thrift securing its $32,325.00 promissory note would be 
recorded ahead of the trust deed securing the 
$24,000.00 note in favor of Mr. Pagan. TR.686, 692-696, 
706. In addition, it was explained to Mr. Pagan that 
if Mr. Cannon did not pay for his first mortgage, Mr. 
Pagan would have to pay in order to protect his 
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interest. TR.711. There was no objection by Mr. 
Pagan or his real estate agents to his interest being 
secured by a second deed of trust. TR.713. Each party 
accepted the changes in the real estate transaction. 
TR.702, 734, 792. Mr. Sisk also testified that the 
transaction between Capitol Thrift and Mr. Cannon was 
totally separate and distinct from Mr. Pagan's 
transaction with Mr. Cannon. TR.714. 
The loan to Mr. Cannon for the purchase of 
the home was made when Mr. Cannon was in good financial 
condition. TR.857, 860-861. The terms of the loan 
provided for five installments with a balloon payment 
for the full amount due in six months. TR.619. Such 
terms were customary for the type of lender that 
Capitol Thrift was, and for the time period in which 
the loan was made. TR.635-636, 863. 
The note subsequently came into default 
and notices of default were given to Mr. Cannon. Upon 
Mr. Cannon's request, he was granted extensions for 
payments on the loan. TR.637. The defaults continued, 
however, and the property was foreclosed upon with a 
deficiency action instituted against Mr. Cannon. 
TR.640. 
After foreclosure of the home, Mr. Pagan 
brought this action. (Mr. Pagan has since died and his 
estate and personal representative have since been 
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substituted as Plaintiffs). Although alleging a cause 
of action against Capitol Thrift in his complaint, Mr. 
Pagan testified that he did not claim a cause of action 
against Capitol Thrift. TR.746. 
The case was subsequently appealed to this 
Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals. 
After filing an extensive opinion, the Court of Appeals 
found that the evidence was insufficient to support 
Plaintiffs1 conspiracy theory, and ruled that Captiol 
Thrift was not liable for compensatory or punitive 
damages. See Addendum "A". 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury's finding that the Appellant 
conspired to defraud the Plaintiffs is not supported by 
direct or circumstantial evidence which can be 
reasonably and naturally inferred. The verdict was 
based solely on suspicion and sympathy for Mr. Pagan. 
The Utah Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the 
jury verdict. After viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the verdict, the Court found that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict 
because it was based on conjecture and speculation. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN 
REVERSING THE JURY VERDICT WHICH WAS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is in 
harmony with the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings and has prevented the working of an 
injustice by reversing a verdict which was not 
supported by the evidence. The Court of Appeals did 
not substitute itself into the juryfs role as fact 
finder, but gave due deference to the jury's 
conclusions. The Supreme Court has found that an 
appellant may successfully attack a jury verdict which 
is unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. Von 
Hake v.Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). When 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the verdict, 
the Appellate Court may appropriately reverse the 
decision. Barker v. Dunham, 342 P.2d 867 (Utah 1959); 
Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 376 P.2d 940 (Utah 
1962). 
This Court, in Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 
598 (Utah 1983) has outlined the standard of a jury 
verdict review when it stated: 
It is the exclusive province of a jury 
to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make 
findings of fact. Where the evidence is 
conflicting and the jury is properly 
instructed, we do not upset those 
-12-
findings of fact except upon a showing 
that the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, so 
clearly preponderated in Appellant's 
favor that reasonable persons could not 
differ on the outcome of the case. 
(Citation omitted) 
See also Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). 
The Court of Appeals recognized its 
responsibility to view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the verdict and accorded due deference to 
the jury as the fact finder. Pursuant to the 
established law concerning the review of a verdict, the 
Court of Appeals determined that the evidence did not 
support Plaintiff's conspiracy theory. Clearly the 
Court of Appeals did not depart "from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings." Rule 43, Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court. 
In the present case, there is no direct 
evidence showing that Capitol Thrift misrepresented a 
material fact known to be false. There is no direct 
evidence showing that Capitol Thrift acted for the 
purpose of inducing Mr. Pagan to sell his home or that 
Mr. Pagan justifiably relied upon Capitol Thrift's 
actions. Since Capitol Thrift did not, by its own 
actions, defraud Mr. Pagan or authorize another, 
Capitol Thrift's liability can only be established 
through some participation in a fraud through a civil 
conspiracy. 
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Plaintiff has failed to support a 
finding of conspiracy based on the 
evidence established at trial. 
The Court of Appeals found that to establish 
a civil conspiracy allegation one must show that there 
was: 
(1) a combination of two or more 
persons, (2) an object to be 
accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds 
on the object or course of action, (4) 
one or more unlawful, overt acts, and 
(5) damages as a proximate result 
thereof. (Citations omitted) 
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Crane Co. v. 
Dahle, 576 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978), set forth the elements 
as (1) wrongfully conspiring to violate the plaintiff's 
rights, (2) the carrying out of such plan, (3) damages 
proximately caused thereby. Crane Co. at 872. The 
plaintiff has the burden of proving civil conspiracy by 
clear and convincing evidence. Crane Co. at 872. 
Plaintiffs assert that Dorius Black, Joseph 
N. Cannon and Capitol Thrift were working together for 
the sole purpose of defrauding Mr. Pagan. The record 
is devoid of evidence establishing that Capitol Thrift 
was working with the parties to defraud Mr. Pagan. 
The evidence established that, other than the 
transaction-concerning the loan to Mr. Cannon, Capitol 
Thrift did not participate in any other transaction 
-14-
concerning the purchase of the Pagan home. In fact, 
the evidence introduced at trial clearly established 
that the loan officer did not even know who Mr. Pagan 
was during this transaction and that Capitol Thrift 
entered into a promissory note arrangement directly 
with Mr. Cannon for the purchase of the subject 
property. Plaintiffs have failed to produce any 
evidence that links the above-named parties together 
for a common purpose to defraud. 
The Plaintiffs attempt to show a common 
purpose by asserting that Mr. Black was employed by 
Capitol Thrift to: 
"seek out Israel Pagan, a person who is 
unable to speak or understand English, 
and a person with a sub-normal mental 
capacity, for the sole purpose of making 
him a party to a well-known real estate 
"scam1 through which Pagan was defrauded 
out of his home". TR.493, 497, 498. 
(Appellants1 Brief at 20) 
This is a blatant attempt to distort the 
record to support an unsupported contention. This 
distortion is simply one example of Plaintiffs1 many 
blatant attempts to do so. 
A review of Plaintiffs1 cite shows that 
there is no evidence to establish that Mr. Black was 
employee of Capitol Thrift. Mr. Black was never an 
employee of Capitol Thrift. Further, there is no 
evidence that Capitol Thrift and Loan used Mr. Black 
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seek out Mr. Pagan for the purpose of entering into a 
real estate "scam". The record clearly establishes 
that Capitol Thrift did not even know who Mr. Pagan was 
at the time of the transaction. 
The Utah Court of Appeals recognized that a 
conspiracy theory can be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence. Pagan at 791. In recognizing the use of 
circumstantial evidence, the Appellant Court stated: 
To prove conspiracy to defraud by 
circumstantial evidence, though, "there 
must be substantial proof of 
circumstances from which it reasonably 
follows, or at least may oe reasonably 
inferred, that the conspiracy existed. 
It cannot be established by conjecture 
and speculation alone". Dill v. Rader 
583 P.2d 496, 499 (Okl. 1978)(quoting 
Chisler v. Randall, 124 Kan. 278, 259 
P.687 (1927). 
Pagan at 791. 
The Plaintiff has failed to show through 
direct or circumstantial evidence that there was a 
meeting of the parties1 minds to pursue a course of 
action against Mr. Pagan. Plaintiffs1 theories are 
based upon conjecture and speculation. The evidence 
does not establish that the parties were doing anything 
other than entering into a normal real estate 
transaction. 
As stated above, Capitol Thrift and Loan did 
not know who Mr. Pagan was at the time of the loan 
transaction with Mr. Cannon. Furthermore, the record 
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clearly shows that Capitol Thrift did not even know of 
Mr. Pagan's mental deficiencies prior to the 
transaction. In fact, Plaintiffs1 own expert testified 
that a lay person would not be able to tell that Mr. 
Pagan was mentally disabled by looking at him. 
Plaintiffs' own real estate agents testified that they 
felt Mr. Pagan was competent to enter into the 
transaction. TR.731, 754-755. 
Plaintiffs also failed to establish that an 
unlawful act was performed by Capitol Thrift. Although 
the Plaintiffs do not clearly assert an unlawful act, 
they appear to be basing the alleged conspiracy on a 
fraud theory. The Utah Supreme Court has defined fraud 
as: 
...the making of a false representation 
concerning a presently existing material 
fact which the representor either knew 
to be false or made recklessly without 
sufficient knowledge, or the omission of 
a material fact when there is a duty to 
disclose, for the purpose of inducing 
action on the part of the other party, 
with actual, justifiable reliance 
resulting in damage to the party. 
Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293 (Utah 1980). 
As with civil conspiracy, The Supreme Court 
has held that a finding of fraud must be shown by clear 
and convincing proof which is not based on "mere 
suspicion or innuendo." Taylor at 294. 
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A person cannot be liable for fraud unless he 
made the representation himself, authorized someone to 
make it for him, or participated in some way, such as 
through conspiracy. Pagan at 792 citing 37 C.J.S. 
Fraud 61 (1943). As the Court of Appeals recognized, 
"evidence is insufficient if it discloses acts just as 
consistent with a lawful purpose as with an unlawful 
one." Pagan at 793, citing Accurate Prods. Inc. v. 
Snow, 67 Wash. 2d 416, 408 P.2d 1, 7 (1965); Dill v. 
Rader, 583 P.2d 496, 499 (Okla. 1978). 
Capitol Thrift recognizes that inferences 
play an important role in any finding of fact, 
especially in cases such as the instant one. Infer-
ences, however, must be reasonably and legitimately 
drawn. This is particularly so in cases of fraud. See 
37 C.J.S. Fraud 115 (1943). Inferences must be made 
for the purpose of aiding reason and not to override 
it. They are nothing more than the probable and 
natural explanation of the facts. Holland v. Columbia 
Iron Mining Co., 293 P.2d 700 (Utah 1956). 
In Holland, the Court was faced with an 
appeal of a ruling on summary judgment that there was 
no fraudulent conspiracy in a business transaction. 
After discussing the issue of inferences, the Court 
stated: 
Common sense and reason dictate that 
evil inferences should not be permitted 
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to be drawn from the routine business 
transaction where there are no other 
circumstances. To hold otherwise would 
throw the door open for attack on each 
and every transaction that one might 
enter into. 
Holland at 702. 
In the instant case, the inferences were not 
reasonably or legitimately drawn. The result reached 
by the jury is neither a probable nor a natural 
explanation of the facts proven. The evidence does not 
support a clear and convincing standard that a 
fraudulent activity had taken place to support 
Plaintiffs' theory of conspiracy. 
The evidence establishes that the transaction 
entered into by Capitol Thrift was a lawful and 
legitimate transaction in the banking community. 
Capitol Thrift had been in contact with Mr. Black, Mr. 
Cannon and Mr. Sisk. These were purely business 
contacts. 
Mr. Black inquired of the availabiltiy of a 
loan to purchase the subject property. A loan was 
extended to Mr. Cannon on the basis of his loan 
application and financial statements. It is 
undisputed that Mr. Cannon was in a strong financial 
position, which provided the basis for the loan to him. 
Contact with Mr. Sisk occurred when the loan 
and letter of instructions were delivered to Stewart 
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Title on the day of the closing. While the lender's 
contacts with Mr. Black and Mr. Cannon were before the 
date of closing, these contacts occurred after Mr. 
Black had negotiated for the purchase of the Pagan 
home. Mr. Black further testified that Capitol Thrift 
was not involved in his plans with Mr. Cannon to 
purchase the home. Clearly, these contacts do not even 
fall within the realm of a fraudulent transaction. 
Capitol Thrift admitted dealing with Mr. 
Black on prior occasions. This fact substantiates Mr. 
Cannon's referral for the loan. One would be 
hard-pressed to find that a successful business does 
not depend on returning customers. 
Capitol Thrift loaned Mr. Cannon $32,325.00 
for the purchase of the Pagan home. Plaintiffs contend 
that this was a substantial deviation from Mr. Pagan's 
agreement. Even if this were a deviation, the evidence 
does not support that Capitol Thrift knew it. There 
was no limitation on the amount to be borrowed in the 
earnest money agreement or any representation that the 
amount borrowed on the property would be limited. 
Furthermore, the evidence clearly 
establishes that all deviations were slowly and clearly 
explained to Mr. Pagan through his interpreter. At 
least one of Mr. Pagan's real estate agents was present 
during these explanations. The closing officer even 
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explained the consequences of Capitol Thrift's first 
trust deed on the property to Mr. Pagan and his agents. 
Capitol Thrift was never notified of any 
limitation whatsoever on any liens against it on the 
property. The loan was based on representations made 
in Mr. Cannon's loan application and on the value of 
the security. Clearly, Capitol Thrift acted lawfully 
in protecting its security for the promissory note. 
The letter of instructions which accompanied 
the loan check to Stewart Title required that the 
title be in the name of Joseph N. Cannon and that 
Capitol Thrift be secured by a first trust deed. This 
requirement does not indicate that the lender was 
trying to defraud Mr. Pagan out of his property. It 
shows a proper banking procedure by Capitol Thrift to 
secure the promissory note. 
The letter of instructions also required 
$4,848.75 to be paid back to the lender. The evidence 
produced at trial clearly established that a finder's 
fee is not an unusual occurrence in the banking 
industry. The testimony of Bruce Moesser, Executive 
Vice President of Capitol Thrift and Loan at the time, 
established that finder's fees of five to six percent 
were not uncommon. 
Mr. Pagan was of low intelligence. His 
doctor testified that this fact could only be 
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determined through testing. His own real estate agents 
felt that Mr. Pagan understood and was competent to 
enter into the subject transaction. Even if Mr. 
Pagan's mental capacity could be determined by 
observation, Capitol Thrift could not have known of the 
deficiency since it had never met Mr. Pagan during the 
transactions. 
At the time of closing, Mr. Cannon was 
substituted as buyer. This substitution was in 
accordance with provisions of the earnest money receipt 
and offer to purchase. The substitution was explained 
to parties present at the closing. 
The trust deed in favor of the lender was 
drafted and signed outside the presence of both Mr. 
Pagan and his agents. The funds received from the 
lender were also disbursed after the closing had taken 
place. The evidence produced at trial clearly showed 
that this was a normal real estate closing practice. 
There was no objection to this procedure by Mr. Pagan 
or his agents. In fact, Mr. Rhodes waited around until 
the check arrived from the lender, but did not take the 
time to review the documentation. 
The loan to Mr. Cannon was payable in six 
months. This type of loan was not uncommon for the 
type of lending institution that Capitol Thrift was or 
for the time period during which the loan was made. 
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This is particularly true in light of the interest rate 
at the time of this transaction. 
The undisputed testimony clearly showed that 
notices of default on Mr. Cannon's loan were sent to 
him. Although the Utah statutues provide for specific 
time periods to foreclose real property secured by a 
trust deed, Capitol Thrift agreed to extensions on the 
payment of the loan by Mr. Cannon. Clearly, these 
extensions do not evidence an intent to immediately 
foreclose upon Mr. Pagan1s home as Plaintiffs try to 
infer. In fact, the evidence shows that payments were 
made on the loan. 
The only inference which can reasonably be 
drawn from these facts is that Capitol Thrift was used 
by Mr. Black and Mr. Cannon to fund part of a business 
venture which ultimately soured. Any other finding 
simply is not reasonable, based on the evidence. This 
is particularly true in light of the fact that Mr. 
Pagan himself testified that he did not have a cause of 
action against Captiol Thrift. 
The fraudulent inferences drawn by the jury 
are, at most, suspicion, and suspicion is not enough to 
support an inference of fraud. One may only assume 
that the jury used the "deep pocket" theory in awarding 
judgment. Even at that, the suspicions do not 
reasonably and naturally follow the facts proven. The 
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verdict rendered by the jury clearly was an act of 
sympathy for Mr. Pagan who was continuously described 
as being physically and mentally impaired. Capitol 
Thrift does not assert that sympathy is not warranted 
for the Plaintiff, but sympathy should not provide the 
basis for a verdict. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT 
DENIED THE MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
AND FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT. 
Capitol Thrift recognizes the right of trial 
by jury as one that should be safeguarded by the 
courts. There are, however, circumstances where the 
issues of fact should be taken from the jury. Both the 
Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court 
have ruled that the reversal of a judgment on the 
ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a 
verdict does not deny a party of a constitutionally 
guaranteed jury trial. Creamer v. Ogden Union Ry & 
Depot Co., 242 P.2d 575, 577-578 (Utah 1952). This 
Court has stated: 
The right to have a jury pass upon 
issues of fact does not include the 
right to have a cause submitted to a 
jury in the hope of a verdict where the 
facts undisputably show that the 
Plaintiff is not entitled to relief. 
Raymond v. Union Pac. R. R., 191 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah 
1948). 
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This Court has set forth the circumstances 
under which the issues of fact should be taken from the 
jury, 
...in ruling on motions which takes 
issues of fact from the jury (this 
includes both motions for directed 
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict), the trial court is obligated 
to look at the evidence in all 
reasonable inferences that fairly may be 
drawn therefrom in the light favorable 
to the party moved against; and the 
granting of such a motion is justified 
only if, in so viewing the evidence, 
there is substantial basis therein which 
would support a verdict in his favor. 
Mel Hardman Prod., Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 
1979); Management Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners 
Ass'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1982) . 
In the instant case, the evidence was not 
sufficient for the reasons argued above. As a result, 
the Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case 
against Capitol Thrift. The elements of both fraud and 
conspiracy were not established by evidence which was 
clear and convincing. Therefore, as a matter of law, 
there could not be a finding of conspiracy to defraud 
Mr. Pagan and Plaintiffs cause of action must fail. 
The result is underscored by the fact that 
Mr. Pagan, under oath, testified that he did not make 
any claim against Capitol Thrift. This case should not 
have been allowed to go to the jury. The trial court 
was incorrect when it ruled that Capitol Thrift's 
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motions to tajce the case from the jury were resolved by 
the return of the jury's verdict. The jury's verdict 
does not change Mr. Pagan's testimony or establish a 
prima facie case on behalf of the Plaintiffs. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY THAT PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAN BE FOUND 
ON A DIFFERENT STANDARD OF PROOF THAN 
THE UNDERLYING WRONGFUL ACT COMPLAINED 
OF. 
Punitive damages are awarded only where the 
nature of the wrong goes beyond merely violating the 
rights of another. For an award of punitive damages to 
be proper, the wrongful act complained of must be 
characterized by some circumstance of aggravation such 
as conduct which is willful/ malicious or in knowing or 
reckless disregard for the rights of others. Behrens 
v. Raleigh Hills Hospital/ Inc./ 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 
1983). Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 
293 (Utah 1982) . 
Even in cases of fraud, punitive damages are 
the exception. The basic elements of fraud, as 
indicated above, must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence and not by mere suspicion or 
innuendo. Punitive damages may be awarded in such 
cases of fraud where there is, in addition to the basic 
elements of fraud, "other extraordinary or exceptional 
circumstances clearly indicating malice or 
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willfulness." 37 C.J.S. Fraud 144 (1943)(emphasis 
added). 
In the present case, the trial court 
instructed the jury in Instruction No. 21, 26, and 27 
that punitive damages could be found from a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Defendants1 
conduct was willful and malicious in conspiring to 
defraud Mr. Pagan. Since punitive damages are the 
exception, even in cases of fraud, the basis for the 
award must be found in additional facts above and 
beyond the elements of the underlying wrongful act. 
Because of this, the standard of proof for the findings 
upon which the award of punitive damages is based, must 
coincide with the standard of proof necessary for a 
finding of the underlying wrongful act. In this case, 
the underlying wrongful act is conspiracy to defraud, 
which must be found by clear and convincing evidence. 
The Court's use of the preponderance standard in this 
instance was, at least, confusing to the jury and, at 
most, prejudicial in the jury!s awarding of damages on 
the Plaintiffs1 cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, it is 
respectfully submitted that the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals should be affirmed. 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
IH THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Israel Pagan Estate and 
Leonor C. Pagan, Personal 
Representative, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Joseph N. Cannon, Dorius Black, 
Alpha Leasing Company, a 
partnership; Robert D. Apgood, 
Joseph N. Cannon, Dorius Blacky 
and Richard McKean, doing 
business under the name and 
style of Alpha Leasing Company; 
Bill Brown Realty, Incorporated; 
Scott Peatross, personally; 
Stewart Title Company of Utah; 
Tommy W. Sisk; 
Capitol Thrift and Loan/ 
a financial corporation; 
and Merlyn Hanks, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
OPINIOH 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860072-Ci 
F I L E D 
N0VIS1987 
Timothy i*L S^^a 
Clerk of ma Court 
Ut2h Court of Appeate 
Before Judges Bench, Garff and Jackson. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant Capitol Thrift and Loan (Capitol) appeals from a 
jury verdict finding it liable to plaintiff Israel Pagan Estate 
for damages arising out of Capitol's alleged conspiracy with 
defendants Stewart Title Company (Stewart Title) and Joseph 
Cannon (Cannon) to defraud Pagan of his home. We reverse. 
Pagan, a native of Puerto Rico, is unable to speak or 
understand English, and has subnormal mental capacity due to 
injuries suffered in an industrial accident• On July 30, 1980, 
with the help of his friend and interpreter, Emilio Ortiz, he 
listed his heme for sale with Century.21 Real Estate. Ortiz, 
with a tenth grade education, was unsophisticated in real 
estate transactions. 
On occasion, Cannon, who was a partner in defendant Alpha 
Leasing, worked with Dorius Black, an independent businessman. 
Black, as part of a business arrangement with Cannon, signed an 
earnest money agreement with Century 21 on July 30, 19 80, and 
executed a $1,000.00 promissory note for the purpose of 
purchasing Pagan's home* This earnest money agreement 
specified that Black was the purchaser of the home,1 that he 
deposited $1,000.00 earnest money in the form of a promissory 
note, and that the purchase price of the house was $44,000.00. 
Of this price, $20,000.00 was payable as a down payment at 
closing, and the remaining £24,000.00 balance was payable as 
follows: payments were to be deferred for the first year; on 
August 1, 1981, a $2,530.88 interest payment was due; and on 
September 1, 1981, monthly payments of $242*67 were to begin, 
which were to be paid until August 1, 1982 when the balance was 
to be paid off with a balloon payment. 
Stewart Title, acting as the escrow agent for this 
transaction, drew up the following documents: an escrow 
agreement, a trust deed note for the $24,000.00 balance bearing 
the same terms as the earnest money agreement, a request for 
reconveyance, copies* of the buyer*s and seller's closing-
statements, and a trust deed- Pagan and Cannon each paid 
$25.00 to set up this escrow account* nothing in any of these 
documents indicated the existence of any other trust deed. 
Black, who owed Capitol $4,848.75 at the time, referred 
Cannon to Capitol to obtain a loan for the $20,000.00 down 
payment. Although Cannon testified that he never actually 
applied for or negotiated with Capitol for this loan, Merlyn .. * 
Hanks, a loan officer with Capitol, testified that Cannon had 
requested such a loan* The record indicates that Cannon filled 
out an application with Capitol for a $32,325.00 loan on August 
13, 1980, five days prior to the closing; submitted to Capitol 
a signed personal financial statement, an Alpha Leasing 
financial statement, and a signed borrower's statement that the 
loan was to be used for strictly business purposes; and signed 
a business promissory note and security agreement for a 
$32,325.00 commercial loan from Capitol at 22% interest, 
payable in five monthly payments of $568.15, beginning 
September 18, 1980, with a balloon payment of $32,518.72 due on 
or before February 18, 1981* This loan was to be secured by a 
first trust deed against the Pagan property. These documents 
were not available to the parties during closing. 
1. The earnest money agreement also stated that title to the 
property would vest as designated at closing, so another 
purchaser could be substituted for Black under the terms of the 
agreement. 
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Pagan's house was appraised at $43,100•00. Hanks 
testified that he normally made loans for between 65 to 85* of 
the appraised value of a house, and that the $32,325,00 loan 
fell within this range ($23,015.00 to $36,365.00). He also 
testified that he was aware that Black and Cannon had a working 
relationship, and that Black had referred Cannon to Capitol to 
obtain the loan* However, he was unaware of the $24,000.00 
agreement between Cannon and Pagan. 
Closing was originally scheduled to take place at Stewart 
Title on the morning of August 13, 1980. Because the 
documentation was not completed, the closing was delayed until 
that afternoon. Pagan, Ortiz, Black, and Cannon were present 
during the entire two-and-one-half hour afternoon meeting, but 
agents from Century 21 and Bill Brown Realty, representing 
Pagan and ~the buyers respectively, were only present during 
portions of the transaction. 
Tommy Sisk, representing Stewart Title, presided over the 
closing* He conducted it slowly so that Ortiz# who was 
translating for Pagan, would not be rushed. He stated that 
Pagan asked him questions about the transactions through Ortiz, 
which he answered, that he explained the documentation prepared 
by Stewart Title to all the parties, and that he explained to 
Pagan the following changes from the earnest money agreement: 
the substitution of Cannon for Black as buyer;2 the existence 
of the Capitol trust deed; that the total loan amounts would 
exceed the £44,000.00 purchase price of the property; and that 
the trust deed in favor of Capitol securing the $32,325.00 
commercial note would be recorded ahead of the trust deed in 
favor of Pagan which secured the $24,000.00 note. However, he 
also stated that he did not know at that time what the exact 
amount of the loan from Capitol would b^. He further explained 
to Pagan that Pagan would be in a second rather than a first 
position, and if Cannon did not pay, Pagan would have to pay on 
the Capitol loan to avoid losing his house. Sisk stated that 
he went through the entire closing before Pagan executed any 
documents. At the end of the closing, the parties signed the 
documents and copies were distributed. 
The seller's statement of account, naming Pag-an as the 
seller and Cannon as the buyer, indicated that the sales price 
of the. house was $44,000.00, that there was a d^ed of trust on 
2. Black testified that he was not purchasing the home far 
"himself, but was purchasing it as part of a business venture 
with Cannon, and that the arrangement was between him, Cannon 
and Alpha Leasing only. 
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the property for $24,000.00, and that the following closing 
costs were payable by Pagan from the $20,000.00 down payment: 
current taxes of $224.07, a title insurance fee of $211.00, an 
escrow fee of $37.50, a sales commission of $2,640.00, and a 
closing fee of $30.00. The balance due Pagan was $16,857.43, 
which he received. 
Sisk stated that he did not review the disbursement 
checks, and that Cannon did not sign the note for $32,352.00, 
the accompanying trust deed in favor of Capitol, and the 
mortgage at the closing because these documents were delivered 
efterwards. He also indicated that the transaction between 
Bagan and Cannon was totally separate from Cannon's transaction 
with Capitol, that he had nothing to do with the transaction 
between Capitol and Cannon, that he had no knowledge that the 
closing involved Alpha Leasing, and that the substitution of 
Black for Cannon was not inconsistent with the terms of the 
earnest money agreement. He testified that the transaction did 
not close in accordance with the earnest money agreement 
because of last minute changes, but that such last minute 
changes were common* 
The broker representing the buyers3 believed that Black 
and Cannon were working together as partners, and that Cannon 
was a more qualified buyer than Blacks He understood that 
Black was the buyer, and was using Cannon as a guarantor on the 
loan, but that, at closing, the parties decided to make Cannon 
the buyer of record because Cannon was more qualified and they 
did not want to complicate the- transaction further by adding- an. 
additional buyer. He stated that he was aware that there would 
be a first mortgage ahead of Pagan's trust deed, and that it 
would be for more than $20,000.00, but was not aware of the 
exact amount or the terms of the Capitol* note. 
Cannon testified that he attended the closing at Black1s 
request, believing that he was- only to be a guarantor of the 
loan- He was induced to do so on the grounds that Black, who 
was in arrears on lease payments owed to Alpha Leasing, had 
projects which, if funded, might be made sufficiently 
profitable to enable him to make the lease payments. During 
closing, however, Cannon was substituted for Black as 
purchaser, and, consequently, signed the following documents as 
3- The broker testified that he did not discuss the 
transaction with Capitol or Hanks, that none of the $4,848.75 
returned to Capitol~was paid to him, that he did not pay Black 
for bringing the transaction to his company, and that he was 
not representing Alpha Leasing. 
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the only obligor: the trust deed in fivor of Stewart Title for 
$24,000.00, the escrow agreement for this trust deed, and a 
statement of account naming him as the buyer of the property. 
None of these documents indicated that Cannon was a guarantor 
rather than the purchaser. Nevertheless, he testified that he 
did not know that he was the purchaser, stating that although 
he had an opportunity to read the documents, he did not do so. 
He also testified that he was not aware that Black had signed 
any of the documents.4 
The real estate agent representing Pagan at the closing 
indicated that he was aware that the $20,000.00 down payment 
would be borrowed, but did not know if it would be a first or 
second mortgage* He understood, however, that Cannon was 
financially stable, and believed that the documentation 
prepared by Stewart Title was exactly according to the earnest 
money agreement. He stated that he discussed the contents of 
the documents with Pagan, and that he was not aware of any 
misrepresentation made at the time. However, he never saw the 
documents brought over from Capitol after the closing and was 
not aware that more than $20,000.00 was to be placed against 
the home. He also believed that the terms and conditions had 
been significantly altered from the earnest money agreement 
because the loan was greater than $20,000.00, and that Pagan 
could not have understood the alterations unless they had been 
discussed with him when the agent was not present. 
After the closing, Hanks brought the $32,325.00 loan check 
from Capitol to Stewart Title. This check, jointly payable to 
Stewart Title and Cannon, was accompanied by an instruction 
letter which directed that acceptance of the check would 
guarantee title insurance covering the Pagan property, title 
would be in Cannon's name, the trust deed would be the first 
recorded, and the funds would be disbursed as follows: 
$4,348.75 back to Capitol, recording and title' insurance fees, 
and the remainder to Cannon or as he directed. 
Cannon and Stewart Title endorsed the Capitol loan check 
and deposited it with Stewart Title to be disbursed according 
to instructions. Cannon, although his signature appeared on 
the back of the check, denied that he had ever seen the check 
or that he had endorsed it. From the loan proceeds, $4,848.75 
was returned to Capitol, $331.00 was paid out for recording and 
4. That Cannon apparently consistently lied about his 
involvement in the transaction only goes to the issue of his 
credibility, and does not directly support any inference that 
Capitol was involved in this transaction as a conspirator. 
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title fees, $1,640.00 went to Bill Brown Realty as the buyer*s 
share of the real estate commission, and $25,00 went for the 
buyer's share of the escrow fee* 
Sisk recorded the trust deeds on August 19, 1980, 
recording the deed in favor of Capitol ahead of the deed in 
favor of Pagan as per Capitol's instructions. 
Cannon received a check from Stewart Title for $13,471*57, 
representing his share of the proceeds from the Capitol loan* 
He deposited this check in the Alpha Leasing account. He 
testified that he then paid $1,000.00 earnest money to Bill 
Brown Realty, $4,848.75 to Capitol, and the remainder according 
to Black's direction, indicating that he received none of these 
proceeds personally. Black, however, testified that he did not 
receive the proceeds except for the $4,848.75 returned to 
Capitol which was applied to his pre-existing debt with Capitol* 
Although Cannon testified that he did not recall making 
any payments on' the loan personally or through Alpha Leasing, a 
$668.15 payment was made on October 14, 19 80 on the $32,325*00 
loan.5 Cannon thought Black was going to be making the 
payments, but became aware that Black was not doing so when 
Capitol contacted Cannon about the loan. Cannon then contacted 
Black, who indicated that he would be taking care of the 
problem. Black did not make any further payments, however, and 
Cannon, whose financial condition had deteriorated 
substantially, was not then in a position to make the payments-
Cannon personally extended the loan in January, 1981, at 
which time a $2,700.00 payment was made. Capitol sent notices 
of default to Cannon on the balance of the loan on May 11, 
1981, and on September 1, 1981. Capitol *then sold the property 
at a trustee's sale for $39,300.00, and initiated an action 
against Cannon to recover.the remaining $12,726.53 balance. 
At trial, Pagan had no recollection of the transaction. 
Ha also had no recollection of listing his home for sale, 
selling it, going to Stewart Title for the closing, or even 
what had happened to his house. Ortiz testified that he 
translated the events but did not understand what was 
happening, nor did Pagan. Ortiz stated that there was never 
any discussion concerning the $32,325-00 note, and that there 
was no discussion concerning the documents that Pagan was 
5. Plaintiffs assertion that this payment was made prior to 
the August 18, 19 80 closing date is without support in the 
record. 
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requested to sign* Ultimately/ Pagan received nothing more for 
his $44,000,00 equity than the $16,857,43 down payment he 
received at closing. 
A banking expert associated with Capitol testified that he 
had supervised the loan to Cannon and did not see anything 
unusual in it* At the time the loan was made/ the prime rate was 
between 20 and 21%, first mortgage money was nearly 
non-existent, and many people were borrowing with .short-term 
"bridge" loans, anticipating that when they matured, they could 
arrange for long-term financing. Because Capitol was primarily a 
second mortgage lender, many people unable to get first mortgages 
came to Capitol during that time for short-tern financing. He 
also indicated that it was normal practice for such lending 
institutions to pay finder's fees of 2 to 3\, and that such a fee 
was paid to Black on the Cannon loan* 
The jury concluded that there was clear and convincing 
evidence that Cannon, Capitol through Hanks, and Stewart Title 
through Sisk, were guilty of conspiracy to defraud Pagan of his 
property. It "found Cannon liable for $12,000-00 compensatory and 
$4,000.00 punitive damages, Capitol liable for $12,000.00 
compensatory and $4,000.00 punitive damages, and Stewart Title 
liable for no compensatory and $2,000.00 punitive damages. 
Counsel for Pagan argues that the evidence supports a 
finding of conspiracy, in which Hanks, Black, and Cannon engaged 
in a confidence game to defraud Pagan*6 
The sole appellant, Capitol, asserts that the verdict is not 
supported by the evidence, but that the evidence indicates a 
normal business transaction that unfortunately happened to go 
sour. 
To prove a civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must show the 
following elements: (1) a combination of two or more persons, 
(2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on 
the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt 
acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof. Citizen 
Stats Bank v. Gilmore. 226 Kan. 662, 603 P.2d 605, 613 <1979); 
Duffy v. Butte Teachers' Union, 163 Mont. 246, 541 P.2d 1199, 
6. Pagan's brief left much to be desired as far as presenting a 
coherent statement of the facts and their application to the 
legal issues. 
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1202 (1975) (quoting ISA C.J-S* Conspiracy §§ l, 2). 7 The 
plaintiff must present clear and convincing evidence to carry 
his burden of proof on a charge of civil conspiracy. Crane Cnt 
v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1978). 
T 5 II? Two or Wore Persons and Obiect to be Accomplish*^ 
Plaintiff asserts the following theory: All persons 
involved in this transaction joined in the alleged conspiracy. 
Their object was to defraud Pagan, whom they previously knew to 
be mentally deficient and, therefore, helpless, by taking his 
$44,000,00 property for $16,857.43, each obtaining some of the 
profit for himself. Capitol was to immediately receive a 
"kick-back- payment of $4,843.75 from Black; later, $39,300.00 
from a trustee's sale of the property; and an additional 
$32,325.00 from a deficiency judgment against Cannon. Thereby, 
it could realize a $76,473*75 return from an initial investment 
of $32,325.00. Hanks, Cannon, and Black, immediately after 
closing, were to jointly receive $13,471.57 over the agreed 
first mortgage- price, while the real estate agents were to 
receive exorbitant fees for their services. 
Supporting this theory were the facts that Pagan only 
received $16,857.43 from the transaction, that $4,848.75 was, 
indeed, paid to Capitol immediately after the transaction took 
place, and that Capitol ultimately received $39,300,00 from the 
trustee's sale of the property. However, the record also 
indicates that Capitolfs deficiency action was for only 
$12,726.58. The difference between the original principal 
amount and the amount Capitol attempted to recover was accrued 
interest at 22%. Further, the record does not indicate that 
Hanks received any proceeds from the $13,471.57 loan, but that 
the loan was disbursed to Cannon, and fails to indicate why 
Cannon would enter into such an unfavorable agreement. Thus, 
we find that there is no clear and convincing 'evidence that the 
parties' evil object was to defraud Pagan. 
7. Utah has no civil conspiracy statute, as such, but it is 
well settled that such an offense exists at common law. The 
criminal conspiracy statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1937), 
requires a showing of substantially similar elements: (1) 
intention that the conduct constituting a crime be performed, 
(2) agreement between two or more persons to engage in or 
cause the criminal conduct, and (3) commission of an overt act 
in pursuance of the conspiracy by any one of the conspirators* 
A civil action further requires that there be damage as a 
proximate result of the conspiracy. Duffy, 541 P.2d at 1202. 
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ITT. A Meeting of the Minds -
There is no direct evidence in the record of a meeting of 
the parties1 minds with respect to defrauding Pagan of his 
property* However, it is not necessary in a civil fraud action 
to prove that the parties actually came together and entered 
into a formal agreement to do the acts complained of by direct 
evidence* Holmes v. McKev, 383 P.2d 655, 665 <Okla. 1962). 
Instead, conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence, including the nature of the act done, the relations 
of the parties, and the interests of the alleged conspirators. 
Wratt v. Union Mortgage Co,, 24 Cal. 3d 773, 598 P.2d 45, 51-52 
157 Cal* Rptr. 392 (1979); Chicago Title Ins. Co, v, Great 
Astern Fin, Corp.. 69 Cal. 2d 305, 444 P.2d 481, 488, 70 Cal. 
.Rptr. 849 (1968). To prove conspiracy to defraud by 
circumstantial evidence, though, "there must be substantial 
proof of circumstances from which it reasonably follows, or at 
least may be reasonably inferred, that the conspiracy existed. 
It cannot be established by conjecture and speculation alone.-
Pill' v. -RatJer. 583 P.2d 496, 499 (Okla. 1978) (quoting ChislSI 
v. Randall* 124 Kan* 278, 259 P* 687 (1953))* 
The act in question is a real estate transaction,- which 
normally requires the services of real estate agents, loan 
companies, title companies, and the existence of a buyer and 
seller* Such parties were present in this transaction* 
The record clearly indicates that Black and Cannon, the 
buyers, were working together and that Hanks and the real 
estate agents were aware of that relationship* Stewart Title 
drew up all the documents except those prepared by Capitol. 
Black had a prior relationship with Capitol, including a 
$4,848.75 debt, which he paid off with proceeds from the 
$32,325.00:loan. Capitol required Stewatt Title to pay back 
the $4,848.75 sum, to record its interest in the Pagan property 
first, and to disburse the proceeds of the loan to Cannon* 
Sisk, of Stewart Title, recorded Capitol's trust de&l prior to 
Pagan's, pursuant to Capitol's instructions. The record 
indicates that the parties did not know of Pagan's mental 
infirmity prior to the transaction, but met Pagan for the first 
time at the closing. Pagan's expert witness, Dr* William 
Barrett, testified that a lay person would not be able to tell 
that Pagan was mentally disabled by looking at him*,' 
Plaintiff asserts that these facts adequately support the 
inference that Hanks, Black, and Cannon engaged in a confidence 
game to defraud Pagan, whom they previously knew to be mentally 
deficient, of his property, indicating that the parties had a 
meeting of the minds on the object of the conspiracy* 
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However, not only does the evidence directly contradict 
plaintiff's desired inference that the conspirators knew about 
Pagan's mental deficiency prior to the transaction but the 
other facts do not necessarily or even reasonably lead to the 
inference that the parties were doing anything but engaging in 
a normal real estate transaction. Specifically, uncontroverted 
evidence was presented#at trial that finder's fee arrangements 
were normal banking practice for this type of loan, as was 
Capitol's requirement of taking a first trust deed against the 
property. Further, the record indicates that Stewart Title was 
not aware of the details of the Capitol loan prior to the 
transaction. Thus, the evidence does not provide anything more 
substantial than conjecture and speculation to show the 
existence of a conspiratorial relationship between the parties. 
IV. Unlawful Act 
To assert civil conspiracy/ the plaintiff must also prove 
that the alleged conspirators performed one or more unlawful, 
overt acts. If the object of the alleged conspiracy or the 
means used to attain it is lawful, even if damage results to 
the plaintiff or the* defendant acted with a malicious motive, 
there can be no civil action for conspiracy. "If such were not 
the rule, obviously many purely business dealings would give 
rise to an action in tort on behalf of one who may have been 
adversely affected." Duffy. 541 P.2d at 1202. 
'." Plaintiff's brief suggests that the allegedly unlawful 
overt act at issue is fraud. The Utah Supreme Court, in Tavlor 
v. Gasor. Inc. . 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah. 1980), defines fraud as: 
the making of a false representation 
concerning a presently existing material 
fact which the representor either knew to 
be false or made recklessly without 
sufficient knowledge, or the omission of a 
material fact when there is a duty to 
disclose, for the purpose of inducing 
action on the part of the other party, 
with actual, justifiable reliance 
resulting in damage to that party. 
A person cannot be liable for fraud unless he made the 
false representations himself, authorized someone to make them 
for him, or participated in the misrepresentation in some way, 
such as through a conspiracy. 37 C-2.S+ Fraud § 61 (1943), 
There is no direct evidence in the present case that Capitol 
misrepresented a material fact known to be false. Nor is there 
direct evidence that Capitol acted for the purpose of inducing 
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Pagan to sell his home or that Pagan relied upon Capitol's 
actions. Since Capitol did not, by its own- actions, defraud 
Pagan or authorize another to do so, Capitol's liability can only 
be established by proving that it was engaged in a conspiracy to 
defraud. However, the evidence shows that, other than providing 
financing, Capitol did not participate in Black's plan to 
purchase the home.8 
Plaintiff argues that the evidence supports the following 
inferences: Hanks and Capitol were fully aware that the 
"notorious- real estate promoter, Black, was acting in concert 
with Cannon, whom they knew at the time to be a judgment-proof 
•straw man" unable to repay a $32,325.00 loan at 22%. They also 
knew that Black and Cannon had never requested or applied for a 
loan. Nevertheless, Capitol drafted the note and the first trust 
deed in Cannon's name without.considering the $44,000.00 sales 
price of the property and disregarded the $24,000.00 mortgage, of 
which Hanks was fully aware, between Pagan and Cannon. At the 
closing, judgment-proof Cannon was switched for Black as the 
buyer, while Hanks deliberately concealed the terms of the 
$32,325.00 loan from Pagan during the closing by delivering the 
loan documents to Stewart Title prior to the closing, but not 
disclosing them until after the closing was completed and the 
parties had left. The promoters, Cannon and Black, refused to 
make any payments on the $32,325.00 note or on the $24,000.00 
contract, knowing that the trust deed on the $32,325.00 note 
would be foreclosed long before the due date on the $24,000.00 
contract, and that because they were judgment-proof anyway, they 
would not be required to repay the loan. Furthermore, the entire 
transaction was financed entirely out of Pagan's equity, while 
the other parties received all the benefits without paying for 
them. 
8. "[I]t is not sufficient that the circumstances lead to a 
mere suspicion of fraud, nor are they sufficient where they are 
as consistent with honesty and good faith as with fraud 
(footnote omitted). When the proved or admitted facts are 
consistent with any reasonable theory of good faith and honest 
intent, they should be so construed (footnote omitted). Fraud 
cannot be inferred or presumed from ambiguous evidence (footnote 
omitted). * - • When it is sought to prove fraud by 
circumstantial evidence, the fraud must be such as would 
reasonably and naturally follow from the circumstances so 
proved, and fraud will not be lightly inferred (footnote 
omitted). The collateral facts from which the inference of 
fraud is sought to be drawn must be proved precisely as facts 
are proved in other cases (footnote omitted). Presumptions of 
fact from presumptions are not sufficient." 37 C.J.S. fiaiisl 
§ 115 (1943). 
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The plaintiff has the burden of presenting clear and 
convincing evidence supporting his conspiracy theory. Dill. 
533 P.2d at 499; Crane v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 
1978). This evidence must do more tha^ merely raise a 
suspicion — it must lead to belief that the conspiracy 
SSlStefl. Dill/ 533 P.2d at 499 (emphasis in original) . Such 
evidence is sufficient.if it shows that the circumstances are 
consistent only with the existence of a conspiracy, John Davis 
and Co, v. Cedar Glen No. Four, Inc.. 75 Wash. 2d 241# 450 P.2d 
166, 172 (1969). Evidence is insufficient if it discloses acts 
just as consistent with a lawful purpose as with an unlawful 
one. Accurate Products, Inc. v. Snow, 67 Wash. 2d 416, 408 
P.2d 1, 7 (1965); Dill, 583 P.2d at 499.9 -Common sense and 
reason dictate that evil inferences should not be permitted to 
be drawn from routine business transactions where there are no 
other transactions. To hold otherwise would throw the door 
open for an attack on each and every transaction that one might 
enter into.* Holland v, Columbia Iron Mining Co.. 4 Utah 2d 
303, 293 P.2d 700, 702 (1956). Evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, "disregarding evidence and 
inferences to the contrary," is, therefore, considered as a 
whole to determine whether the alleged conspirators were 
actually united in a scheme to defraud the plaintiff. Morris 
v, Dodae Country, Inc.. 89 N.M. 491, 513 P.2d 1273, 1274 (1983). 
We accord due deference to the jury as the fact finder and 
do not substitute ourselves in this role. However, an 
appellant may successfully attack a jury's verdict by 
•[marshalling] all the evidence supporting the verdict and then 
9-. Tacts of trifling importance when considered separately, 
or slight circumstances trivial and inconclusive in themselves, 
may afford clear evidence of fraud when considered in 
connection with each other. It has been said ~that in most 
cases fraud can be made out only by a concatenation of 
circumstances, many of which in themselves amount to very 
little, but in connection with others make a strong case." 
Holmes v. McKev, 383 P.2d 655, 666 (Okla. 1963) (citing 
Griffith v. Scott. 128 Okla. 125, 261 P. 371 (1927)). However, 
•[wlhere subsequent acts are relied upon to establish a 
conspiracy, they must clearly indicate the prior collusive 
combination and fraudulent purpose and must warrant the 
conclusion that the subsequent acts were done in furtherance of 
the unlawful combination and in pursuance of the fraudulent 
scheme. Disconnected circumstances, anv one of which, or all 
of which, are iust as consistent with a lawful purpose as with 
an unlawful undertaking, are^insufficient to establish a 
conspiracy (emphasis in original).- Dill, 583 P.2d at 499. 
(quoting Ballantine v, Cumminas. 220 Pa. 621, 70 A. 546, 547.) 
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[demonstrating] that# even viewing the evidence- in the light 
most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is' insufficient to 
support it." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 756, 769 (Utah 1985). 
In the present case, the facts viewed as a whole not only 
do not compel an inference of conspiracy, but directly 
contradict plaintiff's conspiracy theory in many respects: 
First, Black's "notorious* reputation, with which Hanks was 
supposedly familiar, is unsupported by the record. Documentary 
evidence discloses that Cannon, rather than being judgment-
proof at the time of the transaction, was in a strong financial 
position, but his fortunes reversed, making him judgment-proof 
at the time of trial* Despite Cannon's assertions to the 
contrary, documentary evidence indicates that he did, in fact, 
personally apply for the loan with Capitol, and that the loan 
was granted on the basis of his then financial strength. The 
amount of the loan was not made in total disregard of the value 
of Pagan*s property, but was well within xeasonable limits (65 
to 85* of the appraised value of the property) . The 
substitution of Cannon for Black was not only within the terms 
of the earnest money, agreement, which directed that the name in 
which title would be vested would be designated at the time of 
closing, but was fully disclosed to Pagan, and was made on the 
basis of Cannon's relative financial strength as compared to 
Black's* Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that Hanks 
delivered the loan documents to Stewart Title after, not, as 
plaintiff's attorney alleges, before the closing; that the 
parties were aware of the loan's existence, approximate amount, 
and priority; and that Pagan had been informed of it. 
The purchasers did, indeed, have some equity in the 
property and did, in fact, make efforts to repay the loan. 
Documentary evidence indicates that Cannon paid $1,000-00 
earnest money directly from the loan proceeds, and personally 
extended the loan when it went into default. Ah unidentified 
person made a $2,700.00 payment on the loan pursuant to its 
being extended. Finally, the record shows that while Pagan 
paid closing costs customarily paid for by the seller, Cannon 
paid the closing costs customarily paid for by the buyer from 
his loan proceeds. Thus, many of the inferences upon which 
plaintiff relies to prove his fraud charge are totally 
unfounded because they are directly contradicted by 
uncontroverted evidence. Therefore, to adapt plaintiff's 




Finally, to assert a claim for civil conspiracy, the 
plaintiff must show that he sustained damage as a proximate 
result of the conspiracy's activities because the conspiracy 
itself is not what gives rise to the right to action, but the 
torts committed in the furtherance of the conspiracy. Duffy, 
541 P.2d at 1202; Chicago Title Ins. Co.. 444 P.2d at 433. 
Plaintiff asserts that Pagan was damaged by losing 
$27,147.57 as a result of this transaction because he received 
only $15,857.43 in exchange for his $44,000.00 equity. Pagan 
sustained damage• However, because plaintiff has not shown 
sufficient evidence to reasonably imply the existence of a 
conspiracy, he cannot say that Paganfs loss was caused by the 
alleged conspiracy. 
The purpose of a civil conspiracy action is to connect 
participating members in a transaction who otherwise would not 
be liable to the plaintiff* Puffy- 541 P.2d at 1202. Because 
Cannon, against whom'Pagan could legitimately have a right of 
action, is judgment-proof, plaintiff's presumed purpose in 
arguing a conspiracy theory against Capitol is to obtain a 
judgment payable from Capitol's resources. However, even 
though the results of this transaction are unfortunate and 
possibly unfair, we find that there is insufficient evidence to 
support the jury's finding that Capitol acted together with 
Cannon in a conspiracy to defraud Israel Pagan. Therefore, we 
reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Because we do not find sufficient evidence to support 
plaintiff's conspiracy theory, Capitol is not liable for 
compensatory and punitive damages. Therefore, it is not 
necessary to address the issue of punitive damages. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
I CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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ISRAEL PAGAN ESTATE v. CANNON Utah 7 8 5 
Cite as 746 PJd 785 (UtahApp. 1987) 
the same name as that into the guilt or innocence of the accused. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-20 (1982). 
Affirmed. 
is known by) 
appearing on the extradition papers. 
When the state has made its prima 
facie case, the petitioner has the burden 
of going forward with affirmative evi-
dence that he is not the person named in 
the extradition papers. Where the peti-
tioner does this by sworn testimony or by 
a verified pleading and where the state 
provides no evidence in addition to its 
bare prima facie case (as defined above) 
to corroborate the petitioner's identity 
with the person named in the extradition 
papers, the petitioner is entitled to re-
lease. 
(Emphasis added; citations omitted.) 
[1] In the instant case, the State 
presented its prima facie case against 
Topp, who then had the burden of going 
forward with affirmative evidence, not with 
a bare allegation that he was not the per-
son sought. To meet his burden that he 
was not a fugitive from justice, i.e., that he 
was not in the demanding state on the date 
of the crime or that he was not the person 
named in the extradition warrant, Topp had 
to do so by clear and convincing evidence. 
Emig v. Hayward, 703 P.2d at 1051 (citing 
Langley v. Hayward, 656 P,2d at 1022). 
The trial court found that the documenta-
tion, together with the testimony of the 
sheriff, provided sufficient identification 
for extradition. In light of Topp's utter 
failure to make more than naked allega-
tions of mistaken identity, the court's find-
ing was clearly not erroneous and will 
therefore be upheld by this Court Utah 
R.Civ.P. 52(a); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 
1255 (Utah 1987); State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). 
[2] Topp's argument that the photo 
spread shown to the victim and his mother 
may have been suggestive is not properly 
raised in a habeas corpus hearing. The 
cases cited by Topp address the guilt or 
innocence of a defendant in a trial setting 
and are inapposite here. Beyond establish-
ing the identity of the person held as the 
person charged with the crime, neither the 
governor of the holding state nor a judge 
in a habeas corpus hearing may inquire 
(O | KEY NUMKR SYSTEM > 
ISRAEL PAGAN ESTATE and Leonor 
C. Pagan, Personal Representative, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Joseph N. CANNON, Dorius Black, Alpha 
Leasing Company, a partnership; Rob-
ert D. Apgood, Joseph N. Cannon, Dori-
us Black, and Richard McKean, doing 
business under the name and style of 
Alpha Leasing Company; Bill Brown 
Realty, Incorporated; Scott Peatross, 
personally; Stewart Title Company of 
Utah; Tommy W. Sisk; Capitol Thrift 
and Loan, a financial corporation; and 
Merlyn Hanks, Defendants and Appel-
lant 
No. 860072-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 16, 1987. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 2, 1987. 
Vendor's estate brought action 
against, among others, purchaser's lender, 
alleging civil conspiracy to defraud vendor 
of his home. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., en-
tered judgment on jury verdict in favor of 
vendor's estate, and lender appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that evi-
dence was insufficient to support civil con-
spiracy claim. 
Reversed 
Bench, J., concurred in result only. 
1. Conspiracy $»1 
To prove civil conspiracy, plaintiff 
must show combination of two or more 
persons, object to be accomplished, meeting 
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of minds on object or course of action, one 
or more unlawful, overt acts, and damages 
as a proximate result of such conduct 
2. Conspiracy <£»19 
Evidence did not establish that pur-
chaser's lender, whose $20,000 loan for 
down payment for purchase of home was 
secured by first deed of trust on home, 
engaged in conspiracy with purchaser and 
various other individuals to defraud vendor 
of his home, even though vendor received 
approximately $16,000 for his $44,000 equi-
ty in his home, and even though lender 
received almost $5,000 following sale trans-
action. 
3. Conspiracy <3=>19 
In civil action involving conspiracy to 
defraud, it is not necessary to prove by 
direct evidence that parties actually came 
together and entered into formal agree-
ment to do acts complained of, and conspir-
acy may be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence, including nature of act done, rela-
tions of parties, and interest of alleged 
conspirators. 
4. Conspiracy <3=»19 
Circumstantial evidence did not sup-
port vendor's claim that purchaser's lender, 
whose $20,000 loan for down payment for 
purchase of home was secured by first 
deed of trust on home, as well as purchas-
er, title company, and various others, 
worked together to defraud vendor of his 
home, even though vendor received only 
approximately $16,000 for his $44,000 equi-
ty in his home and even though vendor 
alleged that sale negotiations took place 
despite knowledge of parties involved that 
vendor did not speak English and was men-
tally deficient 
5. Conspiracy <s»3, 4 
There can be no civil action for conspir-
acy if object of alleged conspiracy or means 
used to attain it is lawful, even if damage 
results to plaintiff or even if defendant 
acted with malicious motive. 
6. Fraud <s=>30 
Person cannot be held liable for fraud 
unless he made false representations him-
self, authorized someone to make them for 
him, or participated in misrepresentation in 
some way, such as through a conspiracy. 
7. Conspiracy <£»19 
Evidence was insufficient to establish 
that purchaser's lender, whose $20,000 loan 
for down payment for purchase of home 
was secured by first deed of trust on home, 
either made any material misrepresentation 
or acted for purpose of inducing vendor to 
sell home so as to support vendor's claim 
that lender and others engaged in conspir-
acy to defraud him of his home. 
8* Conspiracy <s=>6 
To assert claim for civil conspiracy, 
plaintiff must show that he sustained dam-
age as proximate result of conspiracy's ac-
tivities, because conspiracy itself is not 
what gives rise to right to action, but torts 
committed in furtherance of conspiracy. 
Kay M. Lewis, Salt Lake City, for appel-
lant 
Mark S. Miner, Salt Lake City, for re-
spondent 




Defendant Capitol Thrift and Loan (Capi-
tol) appeals from a jury verdict finding it 
liable to plaintiff Israel Pagan Estate for 
damages arising out of Capitol's alleged 
conspiracy with defendants Stewart Title 
Company (Stewart Title) and Joseph Can-
non (Cannon) to defraud Pagan of his 
home. We reverse. 
Pagan, a native of Puerto Rico, was unable 
to speak or understand English, and had 
subnormal mental capacity due to injuries 
suffered in an industrial accident On July 
30, 1980, with the help of his friend and 
interpreter, Emilio Ortiz, he listed his home 
for sale with Century 21 Real Estate. Or-
tiz, with a tenth grade education, was unso-
phisticated in real estate transactions. 
On occasion, Cannon, who was a partner 
in defendant Alpha Leasing, worked with 
Cite at 746 PJd 785 
Dorius Black, an independent businessman. 
Black, as part of a business arrangement 
with Cannon, signed an earnest money 
agreement with Century 21 on July 30, 
1980, and executed a $1,000.00 promissory 
note for the purpose of purchasing Pagan's 
home. This earnest money agreement 
specified that Black was the purchaser of 
the home,1 that he deposited $1,000.00 ear-
nest money in the form of a promissory 
note, and that the purchase price of the 
house was $44,000.00. Of this price, $20,-
000.00 was payable as a down payment at 
closing, and the remaining $24,000.00 bal-
ance% was payable as follows: payments 
were to be deferred for the first year; on 
August 1, 1981, a $2,630.88 interest pay-
ment was due; and on September 1, 1981, 
monthly payments of $242.67 were to be-
gin, which were to be paid until August 1, 
1982 when the balance was to be paid off 
with a balloon payment. 
Stewart Title, acting as the escrow agent 
for this transaction, drew up the following 
documents: an escrow agreement, a trust 
deed note for the $24,000.00 balance bear-
ing the same terms as the earnest money 
agreement, a request for reconveyance, 
copies of the buyer's and seller's closing 
statements, and a trust deed. Pagan and 
Cannon each paid $25.00 to set up this 
escrow account Nothing in any of these 
documents indicated the existence of any 
other trust deed. 
Black, who owed Capitol $4,848.75 at the 
time, referred Cannon to Capitol to obtain a 
loan for the $20,000.00 down payment Al-
though Cannon testified that he never actu-
ally applied for or negotiated with Capitol 
for this loan, Merlyn Hanks, a loan officer 
with Capitol, testified that Cannon had re-
quested such a loan. The record indicates 
that Cannon filled out an application with 
Capitol for a $32,325.00 loan on August 13, 
1980, five days prior to the closing; sub-
mitted to Capitol a signed personal finan-
cial statement, an Alpha Leasing financial 
statement, and a signed borrower's state-
1. The earnest money agreement also stated that 
title to the property would vest as designated at 
closing, so another purchaser could be substitut-
ed for Black under the terms of the agreement. 
i A LEA v. v//u^i^\srt 
(UUhApp. 1987) 
ment that the loan was to be used for 
strictly business purposes; and signed a 
business promissory note and security 
agreement for a $32,325.00 commercial 
loan from Capitol at 22% interest, payable 
in five monthly payments of $668.15, begin-
ning September 18, 1980, with a balloon 
payment of $32,518.72 due on or before 
February 18, 1981. This loan was to be 
secured by a first trust deed against the 
Pagan property. These documents were 
not available to the parties during closing. 
Pagan's house was appraised at $43,-
100.00. Hanks testified that he normally 
made loans for between 65 to 85% of the 
appraised value of a house, and that the 
$32,325.00 loan fell within this range ($28,-
015.00 to $36,365.00). He also testified 
that he was aware that Black and Cannon 
had a working relationship, and that Black 
had referred Cannon to Capitol to obtain 
the loan. However, he was unaware of the 
$24,000.00 agreement between Cannon and 
Pagan. 
Closing was originally scheduled to take 
place at Stewart Title on the morning of 
August 18, 1980. Because the documenta-
tion was not completed, the closing was 
delayed until that afternoon. Pagan, Ortiz, 
Black, and Cannon were present during the 
entire two-and-one-half hour afternoon 
meeting, but agents from Century 21 and 
Bill Brown Realty, representing Pagan and 
the buyers respectively, were only present 
during portions of the transaction. 
Tommy Sisk, representing Stewart Title, 
presided over the closing. He conducted it 
slowly so that Ortiz, who was translating 
for Pagan, would not be rushed. He stated 
that Pagan asked him questions about the 
transactions through Ortiz, which he an-
swered, that he explained the documenta-
tion prepared by Stewart Title to all the 
parties, and that he explained to Pagan the 
following changes from the earnest money 
agreement the substitution of Cannon for 
Black as buyer; * the existence of the Capi-
2. Black testified that he was not purchasing the 
home for himself, but was purchasing it as part 
of a business venture with Cannon, and that the 
arrangement was between him, Cannon and Al-
pha Leasing only. 
7 8 8 Utah 746 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
tol trust deed; that the total loan amounts 
would exceed the $44,000.00 purchase price 
of the property; and that the trust deed in 
favor of Capitol securing the $32,325.00 
commercial note would be recorded ahead 
of the trust deed in favor of Pagan which 
secured the $24,000.00 note. However, he 
also stated that he did not know at that 
time what the exact amount of the loan 
from Capitol would be. He further ex-
plained to Pagan that Pagan would be in a 
second rather than a first position, and if 
Cannon did not pay, Pagan would have to 
pay on the Capitol loan to avoid losing his 
house. Sisk stated that he went through 
the entire closing before Pagan executed 
any documents. At the end of the closing, 
the parties signed the documents and cop-
ies were distributed. 
The seller's statement of account, nam-
ing Pagan as the seller and Cannon as the 
buyer, indicated that the sales price of the 
house was $44,000.00, that there was a 
deed of trust on the property for $24,-
000.00, and that the following closing costs 
were payable by Pagan from the $20,000.00 
down payment current taxes of $224.07, a 
title insurance fee of $211.00, an escrow 
fee of $37.50, a sales commission of 
$2,640.00, and a closing fee of $30.00. The 
balance due Pagan was $16,857,43, which 
he received. 
Sisk stated that he did not review the 
disbursement checks, and that Cannon did 
not sign the note for $32,352.00, the accom-
panying trust deed in favor of Capitol, and 
the mortgage at the closing because these 
documents were delivered afterwards. He 
also indicated that the transaction between 
Pagan and Cannon was totally separate 
from Cannon's transaction with Capitol, 
that he had nothing to do with the transac-
tion between Capitol and Cannon, that he 
had no knowledge that the closing involved 
Alpha Leasing, and that the substitution of 
Black for Cannon was not inconsistent with 
the terms of the earnest money agreement 
3. The broker testified that he did not discuss the 
transaction with Capitol or Hanks, that none of 
the $4,848.75 returned to Capitol was paid to 
him, that he did not pay Black for bringing the 
transaction to his company, and that he was not 
representing Alpha Leasing. 
He testified that the transaction did not 
close in accordance with the earnest money 
agreement because of last minute changes, 
but that such last minute changes were 
common. 
The broker representing the buyers8 be-
lieved that Black and Cannon were working 
together as partners, and that Cannon was 
a more qualified buyer than Black. He 
understood that Black was the buyer, and 
was using Cannon as a guarantor on the 
loan, but that, at closing, the parties decid-
ed to make Cannon the buyer of record 
because Cannon was more qualified and 
they did not want to complicate the trans-
action further by adding an additional buy-
er. He stated that he was aware that 
there would be a first mortgage ahead of 
Pagan's trust deed, and that it would be 
for more than $20,000.00, but was not 
aware of the exact amount or the terms of 
the Capitol note. 
Cannon testified that he attended the 
closing at Black's request, believing that he 
was only to be a guarantor of the loan. He 
was induced to do so on the grounds that 
Black, who was in arrears on lease pay-
ments owed to Alpha Leasing, had projects 
which, if funded, might be made sufficient-
ly profitable to enable him to make the 
lease payments. During closing, however, 
Cannon was substituted for Black as pur-
chaser, and, consequently, signed the fol-
lowing documents as the only obligor the 
trust deed in favor of Stewart Title for 
$24,000.00, the escrow agreement for this 
trust deed, and a statement of account 
naming him as the buyer of the property. 
None of these documents indicated that 
Cannon was a guarantor rather than the 
purchaser. Nevertheless, he testified that 
he did not know that he was the purchaser, 
stating that although he had an opportuni-
ty to read the documents, he did not do so. 
He also testified that he was not aware 
that Black had signed any of the doc-
uments.4 
4. That Cannon apparently consistently lied 
about his involvement in the transaction only 
goes to the issue of his credibility, and does not 
directly support any inference that Capitol was 
involved in this transaction as a conspirator. 
Cite as 746 ?2d 785 
The real estate agent representing Pa-
gan at the closing indicated that he was 
aware that the $20,000.00 down payment 
would be borrowed, but did not know if it 
would be a first or second mortgage. He 
understood, however, that Cannon was fi-
nancially stable, and believed that the docu-
mentation prepared by Stewart Title was 
exactly according to the earnest money 
agreement. He stated that he discussed 
the contents of the documents with Pagan, 
and that he was not aware of any misrepre-
sentation made at the time. However, he 
never saw the documents brought over 
from Capitol after the closing and was not 
aware that more than $20,000.00 was to be 
placed against the home. He also believed 
that the terms and conditions had been 
significantly altered from the earnest mon-
ey agreement because the loan was greater 
than $20,000.00, and that Pagan could not 
have understood the alterations unless they 
had been discussed with him when the 
agent was not present 
After the closing, Hanks brought the 
$32,325.00 loan check from Capitol to Stew-
art Title. This check, jointly payable to 
Stewart Title and Cannon, was accompa-
nied by an instruction letter which directed 
that acceptance of the check would guaran-
tee title insurance covering the Pagan prop-
erty, title would be in Cannon's name, the 
trust deed would be the first recorded, and 
the funds would be disbursed as follows: 
$4,848.75 back to Capitol, recording and 
title insurance fees, and the remainder to 
Cannon or as he directed. 
Cannon and Stewart Title endorsed the 
Capitol loan check and deposited it with 
Stewart Title to be disbursed according to 
instructions. Cannon, although his signa-
ture appeared on the back of the check, 
denied that he had ever seen the check or 
that he had endorsed it From the loan 
proceeds, $4,848.75 was returned to Capi-
tol, $331.00 was paid out for recording and 
title fees, $1,640.00 went to Bill Brown 
Realty as the buyer's share of the real 
estate commission, and $25.00 went for the 
buyer's share of the escrow fee. 
5. Plaintiffs assertion that this payment was 
made prior to the August 18, 1980 closing date 
1ATJ2- v. uAmmuiN uian 7{$jj 
(UtahApp. 1987) 
Sisk recorded the trust deeds on August 
19, 1980, recording the deed in favor of 
Capitol ahead of the deed in favor of Pagan 
as per Capitol's instructions. 
Cannon received a check from Stewart 
Title for $13,471.57, representing his share 
of the proceeds from the Capitol loan. He 
deposited this check in the Alpha Leasing 
account He testified that he then paid 
$1,000.00 earnest money to Bill Brown Re-
alty, $4,848.75 to Capitol, and the remain-
der according to Black's direction, indicat-
ing that he received none of these proceeds 
personally. Black, however, testified that 
he did not receive the proceeds except for 
the $4,848.75 returned to Capitol which was 
applied to his pre-existing debt with Capi-
tol. 
Although Cannon testified that he did 
not recall making any payments on the loan 
personally or through Alpha Leasing, a 
$668.15 payment was made on October 14, 
1980 on the $32,325.00 loan.5 Cannon 
thought Black was going to be making the 
payments, but became aware that Black 
was not doing so when Capitol contacted 
Cannon about the loan. Cannon then con-
tacted Black, who indicated that he would 
be taking care of the problem. Black did 
not make any further payments, however, 
and Cannon, whose financial condition had 
deteriorated substantially, was not then in 
a position to make the payments. 
Cannon personally extended the loan in 
January 1981, at which time a $2,700.00 
payment was made. Capitol sent notices of 
default to Cannon on the balance of the 
loan on May 11, 1981, and on September 1, 
1981. Capitol then sold the property at a 
trustee's sale for $39,300.00, and initiated 
an action against Cannon to recover the 
remaining $12,726.58 balance. 
At trial, Pagan had no recollection of the 
transaction. He also had no recollection of 
listing his home for sale, selling it, going to 
Stewart Title for the closing, or even what 
had happened to his house. Ortiz testified 
that he translated the events but did not 
is without support in the record. 
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understand what was happening, nor did 
Pagan. Ortiz stated that there was never 
any discussion concerning the $32,325.00 
note, and that there was no discussion con-
cerning the documents that Pagan was re-
quested to sign. Ultimately, Pagan re-
ceived nothing more for his $44,000.00 eq-
uity than the $16,857.43 down payment he 
received at closing. 
A banking expert associated with Capitol 
testified that he had supervised the loan to 
Cannon and did not see anything unusual 
in it At the time the loan was made, the 
prime rate was between 20 and 21%, first 
mortgage money was nearly non-existent, 
and many people were borrowing with 
short-term "bridge" loans, anticipating that 
when they matured, they could arrange for 
long-term financing. Because Capitol was 
primarily a second mortgage lender, many 
people unable to get first mortgages came 
to Capitol during that time for short-term 
financing. He also indicated that it was 
normal practice for such lending institu-
tions to pay finder's fees of 2 to 3%, and 
that such a fee was paid to Black on the 
Cannon loan. 
The jury concluded that there was clear 
and convincing evidence that Cannon, Capi-
tol through Hanks, and Stewart Title 
through Sisk, were guilty of conspiracy to 
defraud Pagan of his property. It found 
Cannon liable for $12,000.00 compensatory 
and $4,000.00 punitive damages, Capitol lia-
ble for $12,000.00 compensatory and 
$4,000.00 punitive damages, and Stewart 
Title liable for no compensatory and 
$2,000.00 punitive damages. 
Counsel for Pagan argues that the evi-
dence supports a finding of conspiracy, in 
which Hanks, Black, and Cannon engaged 
in a confidence game to defraud Pagan.1 
The sole appellant, Capitol, asserts that 
the verdict is not supported by the evi-
6. Pagan's brief left much to be desired as far as 
presenting a coherent statement of the facts and 
their application to the legal issues. 
7. Utah has no civil conspiracy statute, as such, 
but it is well settled that such an offense exists 
at common law. The criminal conspiracy stat-
ute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1987), requires 
a showing of substantially similar elements: (1) 
dence, but that the evidence indicates a 
normal business transaction that unfortu-
nately happened to go sour. 
[1] To prove a civil conspiracy, plaintiff 
must show the following elements: (1) a 
combination of two or more persons, (2) an 
object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of 
the minds on the object or course of ac-
tion, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, 
and (5) damages as a proximate result 
thereof. Citizen State Bank v. Gilmore, 
226 Kan. 662, 603 P.2d 605, 613 (1979); 
Duffy v. Butte Teachers' Union, 168 Mont 
246, 541 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1975) (quoting 
15A CJ.S. Conspiracy §§ 1, 2).7 Plain-
tiff must present clear and convincing 
evidence to carry his burden of proof on a 
charge of civil conspiracy. Crane Co. v. 
Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1978). 
/ & II: Two or More Persons and Object 
to be Accomplished 
Plaintiff asserts the following theory: 
All persons involved in this transaction 
joined in the alleged conspiracy. Their ob-
ject was to defraud Pagan, whom they 
previously knew to be mentally deficient 
and, therefore, helpless, by taking his $44,-
000.00 property for $16,857.43, each obtain-
ing some of the profit for himself. Capitol 
was to immediately receive a "kick-back" 
payment of $4,848.75 from Black; later, 
$39,300.00 from a trustee's sale of the 
property; and an additional $32,325.00 
from a deficiency judgment against Can-
non. Thereby, it could realize a $76,473.75 
return from an initial investment of $32,-
325.00. Hanks, Cannon, and Black, imme-
diately after closing, were to jointly receive 
$13,471.57 over the agreed first mortgage 
price, while the real estate agents were to 
receive exorbitant fees for their services. 
[2] Supporting this theory were the 
facts that Pagan only received $16,857.43 
intention that the conduct constituting a crime 
be performed, (2) agreement between two or 
more persons to engage in or cause the criminal 
conduct, and (3) commission of an overt act in 
pursuance of the conspiracy by any one of the 
conspirators. A civil action further requires 
that there be damage as a proximate result of 
the conspiracy. Duffy, 541 ?2d at 1202. 
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from the transaction, that $4,848.75 was, 
indeed, paid to Capitol immediately after 
the transaction took place, and that Capitol 
ultimately received $39,300.00 from the 
trustee's sale of the property. However, 
the record also indicates that Capitol's defi-
ciency action was for only $12,726.58. The 
difference between the original principal 
amount and the amount Capitol attempted 
to recover was accrued interest at 22%. 
Further, the record does not indicate that 
Hanks received any proceeds from the $13,-
471.57 loan, but that the loan was dis-
bursed to Cannon, and fails to indicate why 
Cannon would enter into such an unfavora-
ble agreement Thus, we find that there is 
no clear and convincing evidence that the 
parties' evil object was to defraud Pagan. 
///. A Meeting of the Minds 
[3] There is no direct evidence in the 
record of a meeting of the parties' minds 
with respect to defrauding Pagan of his 
property. However, it is not necessary in a 
civil conspiracy action to prove that the par-
ties actually came together and entered into 
a formal agreement to do the acts com-
plained of by direct evidence. Holmes v. 
McKey, 383 P.2d 655, 665 (Okl.1962). In-
stead, conspiracy may be inferred from cir-
cumstantial evidence, including the nature 
of the act done, the relations of the parties, 
and the interests of the alleged conspira-
tors. Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 
Cal. 3d 773, 157 Cal.Rptr. 392, 398-99, 598 
P.2d 45, 51-52 (1979); Chicago Title Ins. 
Co. v. Great Western Fin. Corp., 69 Cal.2d 
305, 70 CaLRptr. 849, 856, 444 P.2d 481, 
488 (1968). To prove conspiracy to defraud 
by circumstantial evidence, though, "there 
must be substantial proof of circumstances 
from which it reasonably follows, or at 
least may be reasonably inferred, that the 
conspiracy existed. It cannot be estab-
lished by conjecture and speculation alone." 
Dill v. Rader, 583 P.2d 496, 499 (Okl.1978) 
(quoting Chisler v. Randall, 124 Kan. 278, 
259 P. 687 (1927)). 
The act in question is a real estate trans-
action, which normally requires the servic-
es of real estate agents, loan companies, 
title companies, and the existence of a buy-
er and seller. Such parties were present in 
this transaction. 
The record clearly indicates that Black 
and Cannon, the buyers, were working to-
gether and that Hanks and the real estate 
agents were aware of that relationship. 
Stewart Title drew up all the documents 
except those prepared by Capitol. Black 
had a prior relationship with Capitol, in-
cluding a $4,848.75 debt, which he paid off 
with proceeds from the $32,325.00 loan. 
Capitol required Stewart Title to pay back 
the $4,848.75 sum, to record its interest in 
the Pagan property first, and to disburse 
the proceeds of the loan to Cannon. Sisk, 
of Stewart Title, recorded Capitol's trust 
deed prior to Pagan's, pursuant to Capitol's 
instructions. The record indicates that the 
parties did not know of Pagan's mental 
infirmity prior to the transaction, but met 
Pagan for the first time at the closing. 
Pagan's expert witness, Dr. William Bar-
rett, testified that a lay person would not 
be able to tell that Pagan was mentally 
disabled by looking at him. 
Plaintiff asserts that these facts ade-
quately support the inference that Hanks, 
Black, and Cannon engaged in a confidence 
game to defraud Pagan, whom they previ-
ously knew to be mentally deficient, of his 
property, indicating that the parties had a 
meeting of the minds on the object of the 
conspiracy. 
[4] However, not only does the evidence 
directly contradict plaintiffs desired infer-
ence that the conspirators knew about Pa-
gan's mental deficiency prior to the trans-
action, but the other facts do not necessar-
ily or even reasonably lead to the inference 
that the parties were doing anything but 
engaging in a normal real estate transac-
tion. Specifically, uncontroverted evidence 
was presented at trial that finder's fee 
arrangements were normal banking prac-
tice for this type of Joan, as was CapitoYs 
requirement of taking a first trust deed 
against the property. Further, the record 
indicates that Stewart Title was not aware 
of the details of the Capitol loan prior to 
the transaction. Thus, the evidence does 
not provide anything more substantial than 
conjecture and speculation to show the ex-
746 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
istence of a conspiratorial relationship be-
tween the parties. 
IV. Unlawful Act 
[5] To assert civil conspiracy, plaintiff 
must also prove that the alleged conspirators 
performed one or more unlawful, overt acts. 
If the object of the alleged conspiracy or the 
means used to attain it is lawful, even if dam-
age results to plaintiff or defendant acted 
with a malicious motive, there can be no civil 
action for conspiracy. "If such were not the 
rule, obviously many purely business deal-
ings would give rise to an action in tort on 
behalf of one who may have been adversely 
affected." Duffy, 541 P.2d at 1202. 
Plaintiffs brief suggests that the alleg-
edly unlawful overt act at issue is fraud. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Taylor v. Ga-
sor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1980), 
defines fraud as: 
the making of a false representation con-
cerning a presently existing material fact 
which the representor either knew to be 
false or made recklessly without suffi-
cient knowledge, or the omission of a 
material fact when there is a duty to 
disclose, for the purpose of inducing ac-
tion on the part of the other party, with 
actual, justifiable reliance resulting in 
damage to that party. 
[6,7] A person cannot be liable for 
fraud unless he made the false representa-
tions himself, authorized someone to make 
them for him, or participated in the misrep-
resentation in some way, such as through a 
conspiracy. 37 CJ.S. Fraud § 61 (1943). 
There is no direct evidence in the present 
case that Capitol misrepresented a material 
fact known to be false. Nor is there direct 
evidence that Capitol acted for the purpose 
of inducing Pagan to sell his home or that 
Pagan relied upon Capitol's actions. Since 
8. l i l t is not sufficient that the circumstances 
lead to a mere suspicion of fraud, nor are they 
sufficient where they are as consistent with hon-
esty and good faith as with fraud. When the 
proved or omitted facts are consistent with-any 
reasonable theory of good faith and honest intent, 
they should be so construed. Fraud cannot be 
inferred or presumed from ambiguous evi-
dence — When it is sought to prove fraud by cir-
Capitol did not, by its own actions, defraud 
Pagan or authorize another to do so, Capi-
tol's liability can only be established by 
proving that it was engaged in a conspiracy 
to defraud. However, the evidence shows 
that, other than providing financing, Capi-
tol did not participate in Black's plan to 
purchase the home.8 
Plaintiff argues that the evidence sup-
ports the following inferences: Hanks and 
Capitol were fully aware that the "notori-
ous" real estate promoter, Black, was act-
ing in concert with Cannon, whom they 
knew at the time to be a judgment-proof 
"straw man" unable to repay a $32,325.00 
loan at 22%. They also knew that Black 
and Cannon had never requested or applied 
for a loan. Nevertheless, Capitol drafted 
the note and the first trust deed in Can-
non's name without considering the $44,-
000.00 sales price of the property and dis-
regarded the $24,000.00 mortgage, of 
which Hanks was fully aware, between Pa-
gan and Cannon. At the closing, judg-
ment-proof Cannon was switched for Black 
as the buyer, while Hanks deliberately con-
cealed the terms of the $32,325.00 loan 
from Pagan during the closing by deliver-
ing the loan documents to Stewart Title 
prior to the closing, but not disclosing them 
until after the closing was completed and 
the parties had left The promoters, Can-
non and Black, refused to make any pay-
ments on the $32,325.00 note or on the 
$24,000.00 contract, knowing that the trust 
deed on the $32,325.00 note would be fore-
closed long before the due date on the 
$24,000.00 contract, and that because they 
were judgment-proof anyway, they would 
not be required to repay the loan. Further-
more, the entire transaction was financed 
entirely out of Pagan's equity, while the 
other parties received all the benefits with-
out paying for them. 
cumstantial evidence, the fraud must be such as 
would reasonably and naturally follow from the 
circumstances so proved, and fraud will not be 
lightly inferred. The collateral facts from which 
the inference of fraud is sought to be drawn must 
be proved precisely as facts are proved in other 
cases. Presumptions of fact from presumptions 
are not sufficient" 37 CJ.S. Fraud § 115 (1943) 
(footnote omitted). 
Plaintiff has the burden of presenting 
clear and convincing evidence support-
ing his conspiracy theory. Dill, 583 P.2d 
at 499; Crane v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 
(Utah 1978). This evidence must do more 
than merely raise a suspicion—it must 
lead to belief that the conspiracy existed. 
Dill, 583 P.2d at 499 (emphasis in original). 
Such evidence is sufficient if it shows that 
the circumstances are consistent only with 
the existence of a conspiracy. John Davis 
and Co. v. Cedar Glen No. Four, Inc., 75 
Wash.2d 214, 450 P.2d 166, 172 (1969). Ev-
idence is insufficient if it discloses acts just 
as consistent with a lawful purpose as with 
an unlawful one. Accurate Prods., Inc. 
v. Snow, 67 Wash.2d 416, 408 P.2d 1, 7 
(1965); Dill, 583 P.2d at 499.' "Common 
sense and reason dictate that evil inferenc-
es should not be permitted to be drawn 
from routine business transactions where 
there are no other transactions. To hold 
otherwise would throw the door open for 
an attack on each and every transaction 
that one might enter into." Holland v. 
Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d 303, 
293 P.2d 700, 702 (1956). Evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, 
"disregarding evidence and inferences to 
the contrary," is, therefore, considered as a 
whole to determine whether the alleged 
conspirators were actually united in a 
scheme to defraud the plaintiff. Morris v. 
Dodge Country, Inc., 85 N.M. 491, 513 
P.2d 1273, 1274 (1973). 
We accord due deference to the jury as 
the fact finder and do not substitute our-
selves in this role. However, an appellant 
may successfully attack a jury's verdict by 
"[marshalling] all the evidence supporting 
the verdict and then [demonstrating] that, 
even viewing the evidence in the light most 
9. Tacts of trifling importance when considered 
separately, or slight circumstances trivial and 
inconclusive in themselves, may afford clear 
evidence of fraud when considered in connec-
tion with each other. It has been said that in 
most cases fraud can be made out only by a 
concatenation of circumstances, many of which 
in themselves amount to very little, but in con-
nection with others make a strong case." 
Holmes v. McKey, 383 P.2d 655, 666 (Okl.1963) 
(citing Griffith v. Scott, 128 Okl. 125, 261 P. 371 
(1927)). However, "[wjhere subsequent acts are 
relied upon to establish a conspiracy, they must 
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favorable to that verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient to support it" Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). 
In the present case, the facts viewed as a 
whole not only do not compel an inference 
of conspiracy, but directly contradict plain-
tiffs conspiracy theory in many respects: 
First, Black's "notorious" reputation, with 
which Hanks was supposedly familiar, is 
unsupported by the record. Documentary 
evidence discloses that Cannon, rather than 
being judgment-proof at the time of the 
transaction, was in a strong financial posi-
tion, but his fortunes reversed, making him 
judgment-proof at the time of trial. De-
spite Cannon's assertions to the contrary, 
documentary evidence indicates that he did, 
in fact, personally apply for the loan with 
Capitol, and that the loan was granted on 
the basis of his then financial strength. 
The amount of the loan was not made in 
total disregard of the value of Pagan's 
property, but was well within reasonable 
limits (65 to 85% of the appraised value of 
the property). The substitution of Cannon 
for Black was not only within the terms of 
the earnest money agreement, which di-
rected that the name in which title would 
be vested would be designated at the time 
of closing, but was fully disclosed to Pa-
gan, and was made on the basis of Can-
non's relative financial strength as com-
pared to Black's. Furthermore, it is uncon-
troverted that Hanks delivered the loan 
documents to Stewart Title after, not, as 
plaintiffs attorney alleges, before the clos-
ing; that the parties were aware of the 
loan's existence, approximate amount, and 
priority; and that Pagan had been in-
formed of it 
clearly indicate the prior collusive combination 
and fraudulent purpose and must warrant the 
conclusion that the subsequent acts were done 
in furtherance of the unlawful combination and 
in pursuance of the fraudulent scheme. Discon-
nected circumstances, any one of which, or all of 
which, are fust as consistent with a lawful pur-
pose as with an unlawful undertaking, are insuf-
ficient to establish a conspiracy." Dill, 583 P.2d 
at 499. (emphasis in original) (quoting Ballon-
tine v. Cummings, 220 Pa. 621, 70 A. 546, 547 
(1908).) 
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The purchasers did, indeed, have some 
equity in the property and did, in fact, 
make efforts to repay the loan. Documen-
tary evidence indicates that Cannon paid 
$1,000.00 earnest money directly from the 
loan proceeds, and personally extended the 
loan when it went into default An uniden-
tified person made a $2,700.00 payment on 
the loan pursuant to its being extended. 
Finally, the record shows that while Pagan 
paid closing costs customarily paid for by 
the seller, Cannon paid the closing costs 
customarily paid for by the buyer from his 
loan proceeds. Thus, many of the inferenc-
es upon which plaintiff relies to prove his 
fraud charge are totally unfounded be-
cause they are directly contradicted by un-
controverted evidence. Therefore, to adapt 
plaintiffs theory, the jury's finding would 
have to be based on conjecture and specula-
tion. 
V. Damages 
[8] Finally, to assert a claim for civil 
conspiracy, plaintiff must show that he sus-
tained damage as a proximate result of 
the conspiracy's activities because the con-
spiracy itself is not what gives rise to the 
right to action, but the torts committed in 
the furtherance of the conspiracy. Duffy, 
541 P.2d at 1202; Chicago Title Ins. Co., 
444 P.2d at 488. 
Plaintiff asserts that Pagan was dam-
aged by losing $27,147.57 as a result of this 
transaction because he received only $16,-
857.43 in exchange for his $44,000.00 equi-
ty. Pagan sustained damage. However, 
because plaintiff has not shown sufficient 
evidence to reasonably imply the existence 
of a conspiracy, he cannot say that Pagan's 
loss was caused by the alleged conspiracy. 
The purpose of a civil conspiracy action 
is to connect participating members in a 
transaction who otherwise would not be 
liable to the plaintiff. Duffy, 541 P.2d at 
1202. Because Cannon, against whom Pa-
gan could legitimately have a right of ac-
tion, is judgment-proof, plaintiffs pre-
sumed purpose in arguing a conspiracy the-
ory against Capitol is to obtain a judgment 
payable from Capitol's resources. How-
ever, even though the results of this trans-
action are unfortunate and possibly unfair, 
we find that there is insufficient evidence 
to support the jury's finding that Capitol 
acted together with Cannon in a conspiracy 
to defraud Israel Pagan. Therefore, we 
reverse and remand for proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
Because we do not find sufficient evi-
dence to support plaintiffs conspiracy theo-
ry, Capitol is not liable for compensatory 
and punitive damages. Therefore, it is not 
necessary to address the issue of punitive 
damages. 
JACKSON, J., concurs. 
BENCH, J., concurs in result only. 
Wayne TRIPP, dba Modern 
Drywall, Plaintiff, 
y. 
Jeff VAUGHN, dba Jeff Vaughn 
Construction, et al., Defendants. 
BASIN STATE BANK, INC., Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
• . 
LINCOVE PARTNERSHIP, Richard L. 
Buchanan and Lucille Buchanan, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 860129-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 2, 1987. 
Action was brought to foreclose me-
chanics' lien on property that secured trust 
note. Creditor that held trust deed then 
filed foreclosure action. Upon creditor's 
motion, cases were consolidated Debtor 
brought motions to bring in third-party de-
fendants, to allow counterclaim and to set 
aside partial summary judgment entered in 
favor of subcontractors. The Seventh Dis-
trict Court, Uintah County, Richard4 C. 
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Israel Pagara Estate and Leonor C. Pagan, ORDER 
Personal Representative, 
Plainrxff and Respondent, 
v. 860072-CA 
Joseph H- C?Tnnn# Dorius Black, Alpha Leasing 
Company, a partnership; Robert D. Apgood, 
Joseph N. Carmen, Dorius Black, and Richard 
McKean, doing business under the name and 
style of Alpha Leasing Company; Bill Brown 
Realty, Incnrporated; Scott Peatross, personally; 
Stewart Title Company of Utah; Tommy W. Sisk; 
Capitol Thrift and Loan, a financial corporation; 
and Merlyn Hanks, 
Defendsats and Appellant-
— 0 O 0 — 
Before Judges Garff, Bench, and Jackson. 
Pursart to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 3(a), 
appellant's petition for rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 2nd day of December, 19 87. 
FOR THE COURT: 
TfaJL-
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
ADDENDUM "C" 
1. UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate. In courts of general 
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury 
shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of 
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four 
jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall be 
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the 
jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 
2- U.C-A. SUBSECTION 78-2-2(5)(1988) 
The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of 
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals 
adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review 
those cases certified to it by the Court of 
Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
3. RULE 43, RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
—CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING REVIEW OF 
CERTIORARI 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and 
will be granted only when there are special and 
important reasons therefor. The following, while 
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
Court's discretion, indicate the character of 
reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the' Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with a 
decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals 
on the same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of state or federal 
law in a way that is in conflict with a decision 
of this Court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such 
a departure by a lower court as to call for an 
exercise of this Court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court Of Appeals has 
decided an important question of municipal, state, 
or federal law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by this Court. 
ADDENDUM "D" 
Under the law, it does not necessarily follow from a 
finding that one member of a partnership is liable for punitive 
damages that any or all of other members of the partnership are 
also liable for punitive damages- • The acts or omissions of one 
partner will justify an award of punitive damages against 
another partner or partners if and only if those acts or 
omissions are within the ordinary course and scope of part-
nership business and the other partner or partners against 
punitive damages are awarded authroized, participated in, or 
ratified those acts or omissions. 
If you find that the acts or omissions of Joseph N. Cann< 
justify an award of punitive damages against him, punitive 
damages may be awarded agains the other partners of Alpha Leas-
ing if, and only if, you find by the preponderance of the le pre 
evidence each of the following elements 
1. That at the time of the events at which this 
lawsuit occurred Joseph N. Cannon was acting as a 
partner of Alpha Leasing Company; 
2. That the acts of Joseph N. Cannon were within the 
ordinary course and scope of Alpha Leasing's business 
3. That each of the partners against whom punitive 
damages are awarded sought, authorized, participated 
in, or ratified the acts or omissions of Joseph 
N. Cannon. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ Qz? 
In addition to the actual damages plaintiff alleges 
he has sustianed, he also seeks to recover punitive or exemplary 
damages against the defendants. If you find the issues in 
favor of the plaintiff and that he is entitled to recover 
actual damages, you may also consider whether the plaintiff 
is entitled to such punitive damages. 
Before punitive damages may be awarded, you must find 
the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the individual 
defendants, and further you must find form 
the evidence that the individual defendants' conduct in injuring 
the plaintiff was willfull and malicious. If you so find, 
you may award, if you deem it proper to do so, such sum as 
in your judgment would be reasonable and proper as a punish-
ment to that defendant for such wrongs, and as a wholesome 
warning to others not to offend in like manner. If such 
punitive damages are given, you should award them with 
caution and you should keep in mind that they are only for the 
purpose just mentioned and are not the measure of actual damage. 
Such damages must not exceed the amount prayed for by the 
plaintiff. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO •-J2. 
If you find that plaintiff suffered damage as a proxi-
mate result of the conduct of any of the defendants en which 
you base a finding of liability, you may then consider whether 
you should award punitive or exemplary damages against such 
defendant for the sake of example and by way of punishmer.-. 
You may in your discretion award such damages, if, but cr.ly 
if, you find/by a preponderance of the evidence that said 
^ 
defendant's acts were wilful or malicious in the conduce en 
which ycu base your finding of liability. 
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, you 
are to consider the following: 
1. The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defen-
dant. 
2. The amount of punitive damages which will have a 
deterrent effect on the defendant. 
3. That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable 
relation to the actual damages. 
